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Defense Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome: Implications for the Stoic Victim
by
NICOLE ROSENBERG ECONOMOU*
In the fifteen years since researchers introduced the theory that
rape victims commonly suffer from rape trauma syndrome (RTS), pro-
secutors nationwide have begun to use evidence of the victim's post-
rape behavior to provide a context in which to evaluate evidence sub-
stantiating rape charges. Although RTS evidence may appear to be
most helpful to prosecutors, defense attorneys recently have begun to
seek its introduction. In 1989 the Supreme Court of Indiana became
the first court to review whether a rape defendant could attempt to
prove that a woman was not raped by alleging that her post-rape be-
havior was inconsistent with that of a "normal" victim.' The court
held that the lower court's exclusion of defense expert testimony re-
garding the fact that the victim was witnessed drinking and dancing
the night after the alleged rape was reversible error because it tended
to prove that the victim's behavior was inconsistent with that of a
person who had suffered a traumatic rape.2 Thus, the Court explained,
the evidence tended to "make it less probable that a rape in fact oc-
curred," and therefore was relevant.3
The case is sure to evoke criticism because it compels the jury to
focus on the behavior and lifestyle of the victim rather than of the
defendant. If this type of evidence were admissible, juries presumably
would be entitled to know whether a victim slept with her husband
or lover on the night of the alleged rape and what type of clothing
she chose to put on the next morning.
Evidence relating to a victim's behavior prior to the alleged rape
has been expressly excluded for policy reasons at both the state and
federal levels. 4 In deciding whether use of RTS evidence by the defense
is acceptable, courts probably will analyze policy arguments similar
* Member, Third Year class; B.A. 1984, Stanford University. The author would like to
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1. See Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1192-93 (Ind. 1989).
2. Id. at 1191.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 141-162 and accompanying text.
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to those advanced when a woman's pre-rape behavior was at issue.
Now, as then, courts will be forced to face the problems inherent in
a rape prosecution: who is to be believed when the defendant's word
conflicts with the victim's, and what type of scientific and medical
evidence is useful to the jury in making that critical decision?
In the last decade the defense generally raised the evidentiary is-
sues of scientific reliability and potential prejudice to the defendant
in cases in which the prosecution introduced an RTS expert.' Courts
generally resolved these cases by relying on established precedents and
applicable rules of evidence. If an RTS expert is introduced by the
defense, however, a host of political and social issues arise that are
not addressed by current legislation or rules of evidence. To date, no
court has considered the legal and social ramifications of allowing the
defense to use RTS evidence to negate a victim's claim. This Note
argues that when courts consider these volatile issues, they should look
beyond existing precedents to the policies of encouraging crime pre-
vention and respect for victims in addition to promoting fundamental
fairness for the defendant.
Part I of this Note describes RTS and provides background in-
formation on how and why researchers identified the syndrome. Part
II begins with a general discussion of the requirements for admissi-
bility of expert testimony on scientific evidence. It then reviews court
decisions regarding use of RTS evidence by the prosecution to cor-
roborate the victim's testimony. Next, it discusses and analyzes Hen-
son v. State,6 the first reported case in which the defense attempted
to introduce RTS evidence. Part II concludes with a warning to the
prosecution to exercise cautiously its right to use RTS evidence. Part
III argues that the defense should be restricted categorically from using
the evidence to disprove rape and that the prosecution should be en-
titled to use the evidence to balance inequities in the legal system that
work injustice on women as a class. 7 Finally, Part IV suggests that
5. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 240-41, 245, 681 P.2d 291, 294-95, 297,
203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 452-53, 456 (1984); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn.
1982) (en banc); State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982) (en banc); State v.
Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
6. 535 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1989).
7. The use of rape trauma syndrome evidence does not appear to have been at issue in
any cases in which the alleged victim was male. Because so few males report being rape
victims, see, e.g., Forman, Reported Male Rape, 7 VICTIMOLOGY 235, 235 (1982) (5.7% of
reported rapes in Columbia, S.C. involved male victims in a two year period), the overwhelming
majority of the literature and this Note focus on rapes that involve a female victim and a
male perpetrator. See, e.g., J. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.05(A), at 523
(1987) ("commentators, courts, and statutes often speak of rape in terms of a male having
sexual intercourse with a female"); Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The
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even if fairness dictates that neither the defense nor the prosecution
may use evidence of the syndrome on the issue of consent, the pros-
ecution at least should be able to use it to explain bizarre behavior.
I. Description of Rape Trauma Syndrome
In 1974 social workers Ann Burgess and Lynda Holmstrom coined
the term Rape Trauma Syndrome or RTS to describe symptoms fre-
quently experienced by rape victims." Their goal was to increase the
effectiveness of clinical treatment for rape victims. 9 For one year Bur-.
gess and Holmstrom analyzed the emotional and physical reactions of
ninety-two people who sought treatment at the emergency room of a
Boston hospital for alleged rapes. 10 All of the subjects were women;
approximately one-half were white, and most of the remainder were
black. The socioeconomic status and educational background of the
women were diverse. The youngest woman was seventeen; the oldest
seventy-three."
The researchers interviewed each woman immediately after she
complained of the rape to the hospital staff. They then conducted
follow-up interviews at the victim's home, over the telephone, or both. 2
Burgess and Holmstrom concluded that the syndrome typically
is manifested in a two-phase reaction.' 3 Phase I, referred to as the
"acute phase," is a period of disorganization characterized by one of
two emotional styles: the expressed style, in which the victim cries,
Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69
MINN. L. R-v. 395, 401 n.37 (1985) (citing only cases that involve rape of a female by a
male).
8. Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, in FoRcmLE RAPE-THE CAIM, THE
VIcmK, AND TH OFFENDER 315 (1977) [hereinafter FoRcrLE RAPE]. Research on the emotional
after-effects of rape was conducted first by Sutherland and Scherl and reported in their article,
Sutherland & Scherl, Patterns of Response Among Victims of Rape, 40 AM. J. ORTmopsy-
CHIATRY 503 (1973).
9. See Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 8, at 315. The authors describe the origins of
their rape treatment program:
In response to the problem of rape in the greater Boston area, the Victim Counseling
Program was designed as a collaborative effort between Boston College School of
Nursing and Boston City Hospital to provide a twenty-four-hour crisis intervention
to rape victims.and to study the problems the victim experiences as a result of being
sexually assaulted.
Id.
10. Id. at 316.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 317. Burgess and Holmstrom reported that they followed up with 85% of the
study population by telephone or home visit; another five percent were followed indirectly
through the victims' families or reports of police and other service agencies. Id.
13. Id. at 318.
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sobs, smiles, is restless, or is tense; and the controlled style, in which
the victim is calm, composed, or subdued. 14 Physical symptoms as-
sociated with Phase I often include general soreness, bruising, head-
aches, fatigue, sleep disturbances, gastrointestinal irritability, and
genitourinary disturbance. 5 Emotions experienced during this first
phase range from fear, 16 humiliation, and embarrassment to anger, a
desire for revenge, and self-blame. 7
Phase II is referred to as the "long-term reorganization proc-
ess." 8 This phase begins at different times for victims and is char-
acterized by nightmares, phobic reactions, and sexual fears. 19 Many
of the interviewed victims reported increased motor activity, such as
taking trips, changing addresses or telephone numbers, or contacting
friends and family normally not seen daily.20
Burgess and Holmstrom reported that all of the victims in their
sample experienced Phase II symptoms, though to differing degrees
and in varying sequence. 2' The researchers attributed variations in cop-
ing behavior to factors such as ego strength, social network support,
and the treatment the victims received from others.22
Further studies of RTS have confirmed and expanded on the in-
itial findings of Burgess and Holmstrom .23 Researchers have suggested
that each victim's reaction depends on factors such as the victim's age,
her personality style, the circumstances surrounding the rape, and the
relationship between the victim and the assailant. 24 The results of Bur-
gess and Holmstrom's work have been confirmed even in studies con-
ducted by critics of their methods. 25
II. Rape Trauma Syndrome and the Courts
Although fairly well entrenched in the medical and psychiatric
literature, rape trauma syndrome is a phenomenon that has not been
14. Id. at 318-19.
15. Id. at 319-20.
16. "Fear of physical violence and death was the primary feeling described." Id. at 320.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 318, 321.
19. Id. at 322-25.
20. Id. at 322.
21. Id. at 321; see also S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL-MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
361 (1975) ("[t]here is no uniform response to a rape, or a uniform time for recovery").
22. Burgess & Holmstrom, supra note 8, at 321.
23. For a comprehensive list of supportive articles, see Massaro, supra note 7, at 427
n.139.
24. See id. at 428-29.
25. See id. at 430-31.
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fully accepted by the courts.2 Most courts have held expert testimony
regarding the syndrome inadmissible when introduced to prove a rape
occurred. A significant number of courts, however, allow the evidence
as a means of rehabilitating the victim's credibility. The Indiana Su-
preme Court is the first court to find that evidence of the syndrome
offered by the defense tended to prove that a traumatic rape could
not have occurred. This Part outlines the disparate responses of courts
to RTS evidence.
A. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Scientific Evidence
Until a court determines that the standards for admissibility of
both expert testimony and scientific evidence are met, expert testimony
on rape trauma syndrome may not be admitted as evidence.
(1) Expert Testimony
Expert testimony, like lay testimony, is not admissible unless rel-
evant.27 In addition, expert testimony must "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."'  The test
essentially is whether a lay person can understand the facts without
the help of an expert.29 Even if needed under this test, expert testimony
is admissible only to the extent that it does not create a danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, wast-
ing of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.30
(2) Scientific Evidence
That the results of Burgess and Holmstrom's research have been
mirrored by various studies conducted since 197031 is significant be-
cause the admissibility of expert testimony regarding novel scientific
evidence, as stated in the landmark case of Frye v. United States,32
26. See infra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
27. E.g., FED. R. EvD. 401; CAL. EVID. CODE § 350 (West 1966); M, N. R. 402 (1980);
OR. Ray. STAT. § 40.150 (1988).
28. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 702; CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1966); MmiN. R. 702 (1980);
OR. Rnv. STAT. § 40.410 (1988).
29. See Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 418 (1952).
30. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 403; CAL. EvID. CODE § 352 (West 1966); Mn,. R. 403 (1980);
OR. REv. STAT. § 40.160 (1988).
31. For a comprehensive list of such studies, see Comment, Expert Testimony on Rape
Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 AM.
U.L. Rnv. 417, 417 nn.2 & 4 (1984) (authored by Pamela A. Wilk).
32. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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depends upon whether the relevant scientific community recognizes the
"scientific principle or discovery" that informs the expert's opinion.3
General acceptance of scientific evidence can be shown by its wide-
spread use in scholarly or scientific treatises, and in judicial opinions.3"
A minority of jurisdictions have replaced the Frye test with a more
liberal test for reliability, wherein a showing of scientific consensus
is unnecessary if the court itself is satisfied that the evidence is re-
liable.35 For example, in United States v. Baller,3 6 the Fourth Circuit
held that the use of spectrographic evidence for voice identification
was sufficiently reliable to be admissible in court despite a lack of
absolute agreement among scientists that the evidence was accurate.
Many commentators believe that the principle that rape victims
commonly suffer from RTS is sufficiently recognized by the medical
establishment to support its use as expert testimony in court even un-
der the stricter standards of Frye.37 One commentator, however, ar-
gues that regardless of the test used, judges often arbitrarily exercise
broad discretion in deciding whether to admit novel scientific evi-
dence.38 She posits that judges frequently forsake the Frye analysis and
state their unsubstantiated opinions on the admissibility of RTS ev-
idence.3 9 Unfortunately, until there is a more uniform judicial con-
33. Id. at 1014. The Frye court held that "the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs." Id. This test has been criticized as vague for its failure to identify specifically
whether the relevant scientific community must accept "the underlying scientific principle, the
technique, or both before scientific evidence is admissible." See Comment, supra note 31, at
432-33; see also Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1211-12 (1980).
34. See Massaro, supra note 7, at 435. See, e.g., People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239,
252-54, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472-73 (1978) (treatises); United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527,
529 (5th Cir. 1981) (judicial opinions).
35. See Massaro, supra note 7, at 435 & n.179 (jurisdictions applying the reliability test
include Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, North
Carolina, Ohio, and Oregon). For a discussion regarding the relative merits of each test, see
Comment, supra note 31, at 433-34, n.133.
36. 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
37. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 7, at 439-53; Comment, supra note 31, at 435-56;
Note, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Argument for Limited Admissibility-
State v. Black, 63 WASH. L. REv. 1063, 1074-81 (1988) (authored by Deborah A. Dwyer);
Case Note, "Rape Trauma Syndrome" and Inconsistent Rulings on Its Admissibility Around
the Nation: Should the Washington Supreme Court Reconsider Its Position in State v. Black?,
24 WILLjMEaE L. REV. 1011, 1021 (1988) (authored by Tracy E. Watson). But see Note,
Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on
Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1800 (1984) ("because
the underlying technique is invalid, the relatively new scientific inquiry of diagnosing the
psychological sequelae of rape victims fails to pass a standard threshold test of reliability").
38. See Massaro, supra note 7, at 435-37.
39. See id. at 437. Massaro cites as examples, among others, State v. Marks, 231 Kan.
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sensus, the fate of both rape victims and rape defendants will depend
a good deal on the jurisdiction in which the alleged rape occurred.
B. The Prosecution's Use of RTS Evidence
Although research on RTS has been conducted primarily to in-
crease the effectiveness of clinical treatment for rape victims, 40 evi-
dence of the syndrome has been introduced by the prosecution in
criminal rape trials4' and by the plaintiff in civil cases 42 since research
on the subject first was published in 1974.
Because researchers apparently did not identify or investigate RTS
either to substantiate or to discredit rape claims in a judicial setting, 43
its admissibility for such use has been questioned. In both civil and
criminal cases, however, RTS evidence has been admitted to sub-
stantiate the rape claim44 and to prove damages. 45
In criminal trials, the use of RTS evidence typically is limited to
rebutting the affirmative defense of consent.46 Some courts have ad-
mitted RTS evidence to corroborate the victim's testimony or to com-
645, 654-55, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (1982); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.3d 227, 240 (Minn.
1982) (en banc); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
40. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 699 P.2d 1290 (1985); People v. Bledsoe, 36
Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d
1292 (1982); State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1982); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d
227 (Minn. 1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984); State v. Mackie, 622 P.2d
673 (Mont. 1981); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); Perez v. State, 653
S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987).
42. See, e.g., Delia S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1982); Terrio
v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190 (1983).
43. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 249, 681 P.2d 291, 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450,
459 (1984) ("Unlike fingerprints, blood tests, [and] lie detector tests ... rape trauma syndrome
was not devised to determine the 'truth' or 'accuracy' of a particular past event-i.e., whether,
in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred-but rather was developed by professional rape
counselors as a therapeutic tool .... ).
44. See, e.g., State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654-55, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (1982)
(testimony on RTS admissible on issue of consent); State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d
741 (1986) (testimony admitted suggesting that victim's physical and emotional symptoms were
manifestations of a rape-induced post-traumatic stress syndrome); State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d
918 (Mont. 1984) (same).
45. See, e.g., Division of Corrections v. Wynn, 438 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (testimony on RTS admissible as relevant to the nature of trauma suffered); Alphonso
v. Charity Hosp., 413 So. 2d 982, 956-57 (La. Ct. App.)," cert. denied, 415 So. 2d 952 (La.
1982) (testimony on RTS admitted to establish emotional damage to the victim); white v.
Violent Crimes Compensation Bd., 76 N.J. 368, 387-88, 388 A.2d 206, 215-16 (1978) (proven
incapacity due to RTS will toll statutory limitation on filing claim with Violent Crimes
Compensation Board).
46. See supra note 41.
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pare the victim's symptoms with those of other rape victims.47 Some
courts have allowed expert testimony only when the syndrome is not
referenced by name or when the testimony is given by a psychiatrist
rather than a social worker. 48 Other courts have held RTS evidence
to be inadmissible for a variety of reasons. 49
In State v. Saldana0 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that ad-
mitting the testimony of a rape counselor who had counseled the vic-
tim for ten weeks constituted reversible error." The counselor, a rape
crisis center director who held a bachelor's degree in psychology and
social work, testified regarding the general incidence of RTS and gave
her opinion that the complaining witness had been a "victim of 'ac-
quaintance rape,"' and that the victim, in her opinion, had not "made
it up." ' 52
In reversing the conviction of the defendant, the court stated that
RTS evidence "is not the type of scientific test that accurately and
reliably determines whether a rape has occurred." 53 The jury, the court
indicated, is competent to consider the victim's testimony without the
interpretation of an expert. According to the court, allowing evidence
that "has not reached a level of reliability that surpasses the quality
of common sense evaluation present in jury deliberations .. .would
inevitably lead to a battle of experts that would invade the jury's prov-
ince of fa'ct-finding and add confusion rather than clarity." ' 54 More-
over, the court determined that even if it believed RTS evidence were
scientifically sound, admission of this evidence would be error under
47. See, e.g., People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 952 (Colo. 1987) (RTS evidence admissible
for corroboration purposes only); State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 608, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338 (1982)
(RTS evidence admissible for purpose of comparing victim's injuries to those of other rape
victims).
48. See, e.g., Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751 (not referring to the syndrome
by name reduces prejudice to the defendant); People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 1087-88, 475
N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1984) (RTS admissible to rebut eleven-year-old complainant's renouncement
of the charges).
49. E.g., People v. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d 112, 144, 768 P.2d 32, 49, 255 Cal. Rptr. 813,
830 (1989) (expert erroneously testified that he thought victim suffered from RTS); People v.
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 248, 681 P.2d 291, 299, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 458 (1984) (RTS evidence
inadmissible to prove rape occurred); People v. Jeff, 204 Cal. App. 3d 309, 251 Cal. Rptr.
135, 153 (1988) (expert may not offer opinion regarding occurrence of rape); State v. McGee,
324 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1982) (doctor's opinion that victim's conduct was consistent with
RTS was highly prejudicial and therefore inadmissible); State v. Danielski, 350 N.W.2d 395,
397 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (expert testimony on trauma caused by intrafamilial sexual abuse
disallowed because not "any more scientifically accurate than rape trauma syndrome evidence").
50. 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
51. Id. at 229.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 230.
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the majority rule that a physician may not give an opinion whether
the complainant was raped.55 The court explained that because the rape
counselor was not a physician, had never physically examined the vic-
tim, and did not meet the victim until ten days after the alleged rape,
the majority rule against opinions was especially applicable.5 6
Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court, in State v. TaylorS7 held
RTS evidence inadmissible to prove the rape occurred for the limited
reason that an expert goes "too far" when expressing his opinion "that
the victim suffered rape trauma syndrome as a consequence of the
incident with the defendant. 58 The court emphasized that by stating
a victim suffers from RTS, the expert presupposes that a rape oc-
curred, giving an "implied opinion that the victim had told the truth
in describing the rape." '59
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Bledsoe,60 concluded
that RTS evidence is inadmissible on the issue of consent for different
reasons. The court conceded that RTS is recognized generally in the
scientific community.61 The court, however, reasoned that RTS evi-
dence should not be admitted to prove rape because evidence of RTS
is used by doctors and counselors for therapeutic reasons rather than
to determine whether a patient in fact has been raped.6 2 The court
pointed out that legal counsel and rape counselors take a very different
approach toward the victim:
Rape counselors are taught to make a conscious effort to avoid judg-
ing the credibility of their clients ... ; [they] do not probe incon-
sistencies in their clients' descriptions of the facts of the incident, nor
do they conduct independent investigations to determine whether other
evidence corroborates or contradicts their clients' renditions. Because
their function is to help their clients deal with the trauma they are
experiencing, the historical accuracy of the clients' descriptions of
the details of the traumatizing events is not vital in their task.63
Although courts have been reluctant to admit RTS evidence to
prove a rape occurred, they have been less resistant to the admission
of RTS evidence to explain what appears to be bizarre or inconsistent
55. Id. at 231.
56. Id. The Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d
12 (1987), also found RTS evidence inadmissible for the two reasons elucidated in Saldana:
lack of scientific reliability and potential for unfairly prejudicing the jury. Id. at 350, 745
P.2d at 19.
57. 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
58. Id. at 240.
59. Id. at 241.
60. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
61. Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 250, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
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behavior of the complaining party. For example, when a victim de-
layed reporting the rape for eighty-nine days, a Colorado court held
that expert testimony on RTS was admissible to show that hesitancy
in reporting is a common reaction among rape victims and should not
be construed necessarily as evidence that the rape did not occur. In
New York an expert on RTS was allowed to explain to the jury that
an eleven-year-old rape victim's letters to the defendant recanting her
accusations could have been a manifestation of the common syndrome
reactions of "shame or guilt or fear of public embarrassment" rather
than evidence that the girl had made false charges of rape.65 In Oregon
expert testimony was admitted to give the victim credibility after the
defense showed she had made inconsistent statements regarding the
alleged rape.6 In each of these cases expert testimony on RTS was
admissible not to prove directly that a rape occurred but to assist the
jury in evaluating the credibility of the victim. Indeed, the California
Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that RTS evidence can "dis-
abus[e] the jury of widely held misconceptions about rape and rape
victims. "67
Expert testimony on RTS thus has found its niche in the courts,
if only to the limited extent of rebutting attacks on the credibility of
a victim. Even courts critical of the reliability of RTS evidence in sub-
stantiating rape claims acknowledge its usefulness to the jury in in-
terpreting a victim's behavior.68 To date, however, the controversy
over RTS has been one-dimensional. With the exception of one court,
the issue of whether RTS evidence may be used by a rape defendant
to prove consent has never been confronted.
C. The Defense and RTS: Henson v. State
Despite vigorous debate among the courts on the issue whether
the prosecution may use RTS evidence to prove rape, the Indiana Su-
preme Court is the only court that has considered whether the defense
may use RTS evidence to show that a lack of syndrome symptoms
reduces the probability that an alleged rape occurred. In Henson v.
State,69 the issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in ex-
64. People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 952 (Colo. 1987).
65. People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 1086, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (1984).
66. State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 435-36, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219-20 (1983).
67. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
68. The New York Court of Appeals recently joined the ranks of courts holding that
RTS evidence may be admitted to assist the jury's understanding of the victim's post-assault
behavior, but not as evidence that a rape actually occurred. See People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d
277, 293, 552 N.E.2d 131, 138, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 890 (1990).
69. 535 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1989).
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cluding the defense expert's testimony "that the victim's conduct after
an alleged rape was inconsistent with that of a person who had suf-
fered a traumatic forcible rape." '70
The Henson case revolved around the following facts: The de-
fendant, who had earlier in the evening shared a table with the victim
at a crowded bar, followed her out of the tavern and ambushed her
in her car.7 1 He forced her to have sexual intercourse with him at knife-
point, tore her blouse, and inflicted superficial lacerations on her
chest. 72 At the trial a witness testified that the victim was drinking and
dancing at the same bar the evening after the rape. 73 The defense then
introduced an expert in the study and treatment of post-traumatic stress
syndrome and asked the following hypothetical question:
Doctor, in your professional opinion, a person who has allegedly
suffered a traumatic, forcible rape, would it be consistent in your
experience that a person who had gone through a situation such as
that would go back to the same place the act allegedly occurred and
socialize, drink, dance, on the same day of the alleged act?74
The prosecution objected to the question on the grounds that the ex-
pert had never consulted with the victim and had no firsthand knowl-
edge of the incident in question.75 Stating that the testimony was not
relevant and that a proper foundation had not been laid, the trial court
sustained the objection. 76
The Indiana Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred
in excluding the expert testimony because the victim's post-rape be-
havior would have been probative on the issue whether a traumatic
rape occurred." The court reasoned that material evidence having "any
tendency" to make a fact "more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence" is relevant.7 8 In addition, the court held that
70. Id. at 1191. A traumatic rape generally is defined as one in which there are "aggra-
vating circumstances," such as when the rape is committed by a total stranger, by several
assailants, or in conjunction with other violence. The difference between a traumatic rape and
simple rape has particular impact in the courtroom, where juries are adverse to returning a
guilty verdict absent evidence of aggravating circumstances. V. HANs & N. VmMaR, JUDGING
Tim JURY 210 (1986).







78. Id. Interestingly, the court did not address whether introduction of the evidence would
cause unfair prejudice to the complainant, a counter balancing factor which courts generally
consider in determining the probative value of relevant evidence. See C. McCoMCK, supra
note 33, § 185, at 438-39.
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because two years earlier, in Simmons v. State,79 it had allowed the
prosecution to use RTS evidence to explain inconsistencies in the vic-
tim's testimony, it would be "fundamentally unfair" to deny the de-
fense its use in this case.80
The Indiana Supreme Court's analysis fails for two reasons. First,
its syllogism regarding the relevancy of RTS evidence is both logically
flawed and unsophisticated in light of available medical evidence; sec-
ond, its reliance on Simmons is misplaced.
The court's conclusion that the expert testimony was relevant was
based on the following syllogism: behavior inconsistent with that of
most rape victims creates a logical inference that a rape did not occur;
drinking and dancing at the location of and soon after a rape is in-
consistent with behavior of most rape victims; therefore, drinking and
dancing after a rape creates a logical inference that a rape did not
occur.81
Existing medical evidence cannot substantiate the assumptions that
there can be an "inconsistent" reaction to rape and that drinking (or
even dancing) on the day after a rape is inconsistent behavior. The
American Psychiatric Association reports that
[d]iminished responsiveness to the external world, referred to as
"psychic numbing" or "emotional anesthesia," usually begins soon
after the traumatic event .... Symptoms may begin immediately or
soon after the trauma. It is not unusual, however, for the symptoms
to emerge after a latency period of months or years following the
trauma.12
Thus, what might appear to a layperson to be an inconsistent reaction
actually could be symptomatic of RTS.83 A conclusion that a stoic
victim is less likely to have been raped than an hysterical victim there-
fore is not as simple or obvious as the Henson court declares it to be.
79. 504 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1987).
80. Henson, 535 N.E.2d at 1193. In DeMotte v. State, 555 N.E.2d 1336, 1338, 1339 (Ind.
App. 1990), the Indiana Court of Appeals found this reasoning persuasive and applied it in
determining whether denying the defense an opportunity to impeach the victim who charged
the defendant with child molesting was an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
81. See Henson, 535 N.E.2d at 1191. The court stated,
Dr. Gover's testimony would have tended to prove that [the victim]'s behavior after
the incident was inconsistent with that of a victim who had suffered a traumatic
rape such as that which [the victim] recounted. The evidence therefore would have
a tendency to make it less probable that a rape in fact occurred, clearly a matter in
issue at trial, and was therefore relevant.
82. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATITICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS § 309.81, at 236-37 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter APA MANUAL].
83. See Comment, supra note 31, at 461 n.364 ("[elxaminations, however, may lead to a
diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome in many rape victims whose symptoms might otherwise go
undetected").
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In State v. Black, 1 one justice warned that RTS evidence could be
misapplied if a lack of symptoms was viewed in this fashion:
The defense could seize upon [the victim's] apparently incongruous
lack of hysteria to allege that no attack occurred, or that the woman
consented. The intuitive response of the average juror may well be
to assume that a woman could not possibly respond calmly to such
an assault. In such a case, the evidence presented to the jury by both
parties concerning the victim's mental state and behavior is coun-
terintuitive, and may appeal to the unconscious assumptions and
prejudices of the average juror-or judge.85
The justice who authored the Henson opinion apparently based
his holding in part on his intuitive assumptions about rape. At one
point, he states that "[t]here is little doubt that an alleged rape victim's
conduct after the fact is probative of whether a rape in fact oc-
curred."18 6 Actually, courts are nowhere near a consensus on whether
or not evidence of such conduct is reliable on the issue of consent.17
As one court recently noted, the inference "that because [a] victim
was not upset following the attack, she must not have been raped...
runs contrary to the studies [of rape trauma syndrome,] which suggest
that half of all women who have been forcibly raped are controlled
and subdued following the attack. ' 88
The Indiana Supreme Court's misapplication of medical data is
demonstrated further by its argument that the prosecution's intro-
duction into evidence of the victim's post-rape behavior necessarily
rendered probative the defense expert's testimony that such behavior
negated RTS. 9 The court failed to recognize, however, that a negative
reaction, as alleged by the State, and the lack of a reaction, as alleged
by the defense, do not give rise necessarily to inverse conclusions. 9°
Although evidence of the degree to which a woman suffered physical
or emotional injuries does tend to corroborate a rape charge, a lack
of perceptible injuries or trauma does not demonstrate that a woman
was not raped. One problem with the Henson court's juxtaposition
of the RTS evidence introduced by the defense and the prosecution
is that it assumes that both offers of evidence were scientifically ac-
84. 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987).
85. Id. at 352, 745 P.2d at 21 (Utter, J., concurring).
86. Henson, 535 N.E.2d at 1193.
87. See supra notes 43-67 and accompanying text.
88. People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 293, 552 N.E.2d 131, 138, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 890
(1990).
89. The court reasoned that if the prosecution's offer of evidence of the victim's emotional
trauma was 'relevant to prove rape, the defense expert's testimony regarding her alleged
nonsensitivity on the day after the rape was equally probative of whether a rape in fact
occurred. Henson, 535 N.E.2d at 1193.
90. See supra Part I.
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curate and therefore acceptable. They were not. Experts agree that a
sexual attack can cause physical9' and emotional injuries.92 They also
agree that "psychic numbing" or apparent indifference can be symp-
toms of a sexual attack. 93 There is no medical foundation as yet, how-
ever, for the assertion that the victim's apparent indifference proves
that a rape did not occur. 94
The second prong of the court's analysis in Henson is that it would
be "fundamentally unfair" to preclude defensive use of RTS evidence
since previously the court had allowed the prosecution to use RTS
evidence in other criminal trials. 95 In Simmons, the Henson court stated,
The Indiana Supreme Court had allowed the use of expert testimony
on RTS to show that the victim's behavior was consistent with that
of a person who had suffered a traumatic rape and thus to prove that
a rape had occurred. 96 The Henson court errs, however, in its reading
of how the RTS evidence actually was used at the Simmons trial.
In Simmons the victim's credibility was at issue because she orig-
inally told the police an entirely different story about her abduction
and rape than she related a month later.9 7 At the trial there was an
inconsistency regarding whether the victim and the defendant had
stopped at a particular supermarket to cash a check.98 To rebut the
defense counsel's challenge to the victim's story, the prosecution in-
troduced two experts to testify that the victim's inability to recall the
sequence of events on the day of the rape was consistent with RTS.99
91. More than half of the reported cases involve some type of force: 250 involve
weapons. J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 519. According to psychologist Nicholas Groth,
promulgator of a typology of rapists that has been considered a standard for the last ten
years, The Mind of the Rapist, NEWSWEEK, Jul. 23, 1990, at 48, "anger rapists" attack
impulsively in a vengeful rage and use excessive force-punching, choking, and kicking their
victims into submission. Groth, The Rapist's View, in RAPE-CRIsIS AND RECOVERY 24-5
(Burgess & Holmstrom ed. 1979)
Infection with the AIDS virus is another physical injury a rape victim could suffer. "'A sex
offender walking around HIV-positive is like a loaded shotgun."' A Frightening Aftermath-
Concern About AIDS Adds to the Trauma of Rape, NEWSWEEK, Jul. 23, 1990, at 53 (quoting
Gerald Kaplan, executive director of Alpha Human Services, a sex-offender treatment center
in Minneapolis).
92. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
93. APA MANUAL, supra note 82, § 309.81, at 236.
94. It is one commentator's opinion, however, that "[b]ecause virtually all rape victims
experience at least an acute reaction to rape, the absence of such a reaction would be probative
of consent, assuming that the victim had been examined within a short time after the rape."
See Comment, supra note 31, at 460-61.
95. Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1193 (Ind. 1989).
96. Id. at 1192.
97. Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 577-79 (Ind. 1987).
98. Id. at 578.
99. Id. at 578-79.
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The prosecution's reason for using RTS evidence, therefore, was to
give the jury an appreciation for why the complainant may have for-
gotten or lied about the facts surrounding the alleged rape. '°° The pros-
ecution did -not use RTS evidence in its case in chief, but rather to
rebut attacks on the victim's credibility made by the defense. This use
of RTS evidence was particularly appropriate because, in the words
of the California Supreme Court (which ultimately held RTS evidence
inadmissible to prove a rape occurred), 01 when used to rebut the in-
ference of consent that arises when the alleged rapist suggests that the
victim's post-rape conduct is inconsistent with her claim of rape, RTS
evidence can serve to "disabus[e] the jury of some widely held mhis-
conceptions abouit rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the
evidence free of the constraints of popular myths.' 11 2
Although the Simmons court only admitted the RTS evidence for
the limited purpose of explaining bizarre behavior to support the cred-
ibility of the witness, the Henson court incorrectly interpreted Sim-
mons as holding that the state may introduce RTS evidence to prove
a rape occurred. 03 Arguably, therefore, prohibiting the defense from
introducing RTS evidence to prove a rape did not occur would not
in fact have caused the defendant to suffer the "fundamental injus-
tice" predicted by the Henson court.
D. A Warning to the State: Use RTS Evidence with Care
A fine line divides the prosecution's objective in Simmons and
the defense's objective in Henson. The prosecution may be well ad-
vised to avoid the use of expert testimony on RTS because once the
matter is in issue, the court may permit the defense to order the victim
to submit to a psychiatric examination and call its own RTS expert. 04
In many cases, however, RTS evidence may constitute an essential part.
of the state's case, as for example, when there is no physical evi-
dence. 05 The tension between these two concerns should be resolved
carefully by prosectors on a case-by-case basis.
100. Id. One of the experts testified that in her opinion the defendant was a "power
rapist" who used death threats to force the victim to make up a false story about her
whereabouts on the night of the rape. Id. at 579.
101. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
102. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 2d 236, 247-248, 681 P.2d 291, 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450,
457 (1984).
103. See Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind. 1989). The Henson court thus
accorded the Simmons decision more breadth than the Simmons court seems to have intended.
104. See Comment, supra note 31, at 459.
105. See id. at 423-24 (circumstantial evidence of the complainant's psychological condition
is very important because in many cases physical evidence is unavailable).
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(1) RTS Evidence as the Losing Factor
A rape conviction is most likely in cases such as Henson, in which
there is evidence of force and physical injury. 1°6 In these cases, the
prosecution probably can win its case without resorting to RTS evi-
dence. In fact, in such cases the prosecution even may jeopardize its
chances of winning by introducing expert testimony on RTS. In State
v. Taylor, 0 7 for example, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the
State had sufficiently established the elements of force and noncon-
sensual intercourse. 108 The victim testified that she had been knocked
to the floor by a blow between the eyes; the hospital report indicated
"a cut lip, bruises and swelling of [the] forehead, and scratches on
[the] neck." 109 The defendant offered no evidence at the trial and was
convicted. On appeal the defendant based his entire argument on the
prosecution's introduction of RTS evidence." 0 Arguably, had the pros-
ecution not introduced expert testimony on RTS the prosecution could
have won on the basis of the physical evidence alone and the defense
would have had no basis for an appeal."'
Because a victim's physical injuries are so helpful in securing a
conviction, prosecutors may be tempted to introduce evidence of emo-
tional injury as routinely as evidence of bruises, scratches, or swelling.
One commentator has characterized emotional injuries as "psycho-
logical bruises" and asserts that they are as relevant as physical bruises
on the issue of consent." 2 In many cases, however, although RTS ev-
106. Juries are reluctant to convict when there is no evidence of aggravating circumstances.
See V. HArs & N. ViiomAR, supra note 70, at 210 (one study showed that juries acquitted
6001o of the rape defendants that judges would have convicted).
107. 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
108. Id. at 241.
109. Id. at 236.
110. Id. The defendant claimed that an improper foundation was laid for the expert
testimony and that the expert's opinion was based on hearsay statements, invaded the province
of the jury, and was irrelevant and immaterial.
111. Cf. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 252, 681 P.2d 291, 301-02, 203 Cal. Rptr.
450, 461 (1984) The California Supreme Court, though it found expert evidence of RTS should
not have been admitted, affirmed the conviction because "the testimony did little more than
provide the jury with information that it either already had or that was not particularly
pertinent to the facts of this case." Id. Interestingly, the prosecution, in its own closing
argument, stated that the rape counselor's testimony was unnecessary:
[The rape counselor] described what she called rape crisis syndrome trauma. "Do
we need to produce an expert for you to figure that out? I mean it's almost like
producing an expert to come in here to tell you the sky is blue, usually, unless it's
cloudy. Wouldn't you expect someone who's been subjected to this brutal, animalistic
assault to have some sort of trauma, some sort of disorganization? We really didn't
need her testimony, but it put a little light on things, didn't it?"
Id. at 252 n.15, 681 P.2d at 302 n.15, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 461 n.15.
112. See Massaro, supra note 7, at 439-40.
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idence may not hamper the prosecution's case as it did in Taylor, the
prosecution might add nothing to its case by introducing expert tes-
timony on RTS.113
Lay testimony regarding a victim's physical and emotional state
after the rape is admissible 1 4 and probably is sufficient in most cases
to assist the jury in determining whether a complainant was a victim
of rape.11 5 In most cases jurors and judges are capable of making ra-
tional inferences about typical trauma reactions without the "scientific
cachet' '1 6 lent by the testimony of an expert." 7 A jury can understand
the implications of a swollen lip, a black eye, lacerated breasts, or
emotional reactions such as nightmares, nausea, or phobias. The pros-
ecution probably would gain no psychological edge by introducing
such evidence through an expert rather than a lay person. Further-
more, despite concern to the contrary, studies show that jurors do not
accord inordinate weight to the opinion of an expert." 8
Thus, after hearing lay evidence of the victim's physical and emo-
tional trauma, the judge and jury will expect the defense to provide
a "plausible, innocent explanation" for the victim's injuries." 9 The
prosecution's calling an expert witness accomplishes little more, yet
risks objections from the defense that ultimately could confuse the
jury or form the basis for an appeal. In short, in a case in which jury
sympathy is with the victim because her injuries are apparent, the state's
best strategy may be to let the victim's testimony or that of a lay ob-
servor speak for itself.
113. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 252, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 461, 681 P.2d at 301-02 (stating
that although it should not have been admitted, the RTS testimony did nothing more than
provide the jury with information it already had or with irrelevant material); see also State v.
Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1982) (in absence of unusual circumstances jury can
assess victim's credibility without expert assistance).
114. See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 694 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. App. 1985) (evidence from a hospital
sexual assault report that the prosecutrix was quiet, subdued, and crying quietly was admissible);
State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 349, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (1987) ("The State is free to offer
lay testimony on these matters, and the jury is free to evaluate it as it would any other
evidence.").
115. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 (stating that
lay jurors are "fully competent" to consider nonexpert testimony in determining whether a
rape occurred).
116. State v. Pollard, 719 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (on appeal, defendant
contended that expert's opinion that the victim was sexually abused gave a "scientific cachet"
to the victim's testimony).
117. In State v. Thompson, 668 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), the court stated
that the jury could infer that the sexual activities charged had been nonconsensual from lay
testimony that the victims had made major life changes since the alleged rape.
118. See Massaro, supra note 7, at 444-45.
119. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 252, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 461 681 P.2d at 301-02 (victim's case
was strong enough without RTS evidence because her distress was severe and defendant offered
rio explanation for her physical and emotional trauma).
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(2) RTS Evidence as the Crucial Factor
One of the unfortunate realities of a rape prosecution is that often
there is no physical evidence.120 The victim may have yielded to the
rapist for fear of being seriously injured, or any physical injuries sus-
tained may have subsided by the time the rape was reported.'12 In these
cases, evidence of RTS may be the prosecution's only corroborating
evidence.
A second unfortunate fact about the typical rape prosecution is
that the sympathy of the jurors generally lies with the defendant.'2 As
one commentator observed, "[D]own deep, people feel there is some
reason why women are raped. Men believe women can't be raped. And
I don't find women sympathetic or understanding toward victims. There
seems to be a general social feeling against victims of rape."'2 3 Thus,
in cases in which there is little or no evidence of physical injury, al-
lowing the state to introduce expert testimony on RTS could reduce
the substantial inequities the state faces in prosecuting its case. The
expert testimony on "psychological bruises" could illustrate for the
jury that there is more than one type of corroborating evidence to
consider and could help the jurors better to understand the victim.
Thus, when there is little or no physical evidence to corroborate
the rape charge, or when the defense has challenged the victim's cred-
ibility by alluding to inconsistencies between her conduct and her al-
legations, the prosecution should be entitled to call an RTS expert.
The state should refrain from doing so, however, when there is a sub-
stantial amount of physical evidence; in such a case, the jury generally
does not need the additional evidence and the state runs the risk of
confusing the jury or prejudicing the defendant.
III. Proposed Solution: Admissible for the Prosecution;
Denied to the Defense
In the interest of protecting victims, states should be convicting
accused rapists at the same rate as defendants accused of other serious
crimes. 24 Rape cases are difficult to prosecute successfully because
120. See Case Note, "'Rape Trauma Syndrome" and Inconsistent Rulings on Its Admissi-
bility Around the Nation: Should the Washington Supreme Court Reconsider Its Position in
State v. Black? 24 WItLAMErrE L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1988) (authored by Tracy E. Watson).
121. Id.
122. Massaro, supra note 7, at 404-08.
123. V. HANs & N. VrDmMA, supra note 70, at 216.
124. See LeGrand, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, in FORCIBLE RAPE,
supra note 8, at 67, 71 (in California there is a higher acquittal rate for rape than for any
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME
there are rarely eyewitnesses;'2 "[c]ircumstantial evidence and the
complainant's word, therefore, often constitute the only proof avail-
able to the state."' 126 The first section of this Part illustrates why the
prosecution needs and should be allowed to use RTS evidence to in-
crease its chances of winning a conviction.
At the same time, it is appropriate in most cases to deny the de-
fense's offer of RTS evidence. The second section of this Part argues
that depriving the defense of the opportunity to use evidence of a
woman's post-rape behavior as a means to establish its defense or to
cross-examine the witness is not unfair and is supported by policy rea-
sons analogous to those supporting the enactment of rape shield sta-
tutes. Further, the section reiterates that the defense is not entitled to
evidence of the victim's subsequent behavior because it is not pro-
bative on the issue of consent if the behavior in question is a lack of
RTS symptoms.
A. Why the State Should Be Allowed to Use RTS Evidence
In a rape prosecution, a prosecutor not only must do battle with
very little evidence but also must wage war against a general feeling
of distrust and distaste for rape victims.127 In addition, she must pres-
ent her case to a jury that may entertain various misconceptions about
women and rape. Jurors tend to believe, for example, that the victim
was "asking for it,"' 2 that she actually wanted to be raped, 2 9 or that
she was not raped at all.130 Implicit in these beliefs is the assumption
that the woman bringing formal criminal charges against the defendant
is not to be believed.13 1 This fundamental lack of faith in a woman's
other felony). The overall rape conviction rate in the 20-year period from 1961 to 1980 was
61.4%, much lower than the average conviction rate for other serious crimes. V. HA~s & N.
Vms-A, supra note 70, at 211.
125. State v. Burke, 719 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
126. Id.
127. See Weis & Borges, Victimology and Rape: The Case of the Legitimate Victim, in
RAE VicTimoLoroy 91, 99 (1975) ("The victim of a crime against the person is often stigmatized.
He or she will be avoided as though people are seeking to avoid the danger of contagion.").
128. One theory is that our society, and therefore the average jury, has a need to construct
elaborate rationalizations to prove why the victim was worthy of blame and got what she
deserved. See id. at 98.
129. See Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, in FoRcmLE RAPE, supra note 8, at 47,
50-51.
130. The opinion in Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1192-93 (Ind. 1989), indicates that
the justices believed inconsistent behavior after the incident in question tends to prove that
the victim was not raped.
131. See S. BROWTNMILER, supra note 21, at 369 (referring to the "cherished male
assumption that female persons tend to lie").
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rape charge is in sharp contrast with the unquestioned credibility ac-
corded victims who bring charges of, for example, robbery.12
The belief that a rape charge is to be viewed with suspicion is a
vestige of Lord Hale's famous warning that a rape charge is "an ac-
cusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be
defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.' 13  Many com-
mentators have asserted that Hale's epitaph is no longer viable today
for various reasons. 134 First, modern psychologists no longer diagnose
young girls and women as suffering from "multifarious psychic com-
plexes" or "abnormal instincts" that would drive them to .'contriv[e]
false charges of sexual offenses by men."' 135 Second, the theory that
women fantasize about rape or that a rape charge is the product of
repressed sexuality has been criticized consistently. 136 Third, because
it is no longer a social stigma to be sexually active or to be involved
in an interracial relationship, women purportedly have no need to claim
rape to preserve their reputations. 37
Reporting a rape is generally so stressful and traumatic for the
victim that, as one commentator has observed, "it is amazing that any
rape cases ever come to trial.' 13 Lord Hale's instruction must yield
to the more modern interpretation that an accusation of rape is made
with great difficulty. Indeed, a rape charge may be easier to defend
against than it is to prosecute successfully. 39 Thus, allowing the pros-
ecution to use RTS evidence could be an effective way to neutralize
the bias against the rape victim without causing undue prejudice to
the defense. 4°
132. Although most rape victims who testify in court will have to prove they did not
consent, and in practice will have to prove this by demonstrating that force was used, see S.
ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 18, 19 (1987) (the degree of force used by the defendant and the level
of resistance on the part of the victim is critical for conviction), robbery victims are never
asked the degree to which they resisted the robber. See id. at 383.
133. 1 M. HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE *635.
134. See, e.g., S. BROWNMELER, supra note 21, at 369 ("Hale's quaint homily has poorly
stood the test of time despite its popularity"); Massaro, supra note 7, at 418-23 ("some writers
see Hale's comment . . . as an indictment of the law's insensitivity to the victims of rape");
Wood, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, in RAPE VicTIMOY, supra
note 127, at 194-203 (responding to arguments that women fabricate stories of forcible rape
to trap innocent men).
135. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 21, at 370 (quoting 3A J. WioMoRE, EvImCE § 924a
(1970)).
136. Massaro, supra note 7, at 419-20.
137. See LeGrand, supra note 124, at 74-75.
138. See Wood, supra note 134, at 195; see also Massaro, supra note 7, at 422-23 (discussion
of the unpleasant after-effects on the victim's relationships with friends, acquaintances, and
lovers).
139. See, e.g., State v. Walgraeve, 243 Or. 328, 330, 412 P.2d 23, 24 (1966) ("[I]n cases
involving adults it [may be] difficult to prove that a sex act was the culmination of force
exerted by the male rather than the mutual act of the participants.").
140. Because jurors are not overcome with sympathy for the victim they will not accord
1162 [Vol. 42
On the other hand, the defense should be, restricted from using
RTS evidence for the same reasons it generally is restricted from using
evidence of a victim's pre-rape sexual conduct: namely, to protect the
victim's privacy and encourage her to report and prosecute the rape.
A second but equally important justification for such a restriction is
to mitigate the prejudicial effect such testimony can have on the av-
erage judge or juror.
B. Why the Use of RTS Evidence Should Be Denied the Defense
The federal government, 141 the military, 142 and nearly every state
in the nation'43 have enacted legislation to protect a victim's privacy
during the course of a prosecution for rape. These laws, commonly
referred to as "rape shield" 44 statutes, were passed as a result of wide-
spread criticism by feminist activists and law enforcement officials. 145
The feminist interest in rape legislation reform was manifold.
Feminists believed that the law of rape, which originally was conceived
as a means of protecting the property rights of a father or husband,'"6
should be rewritten to expunge the influence of oppressive male at-
titudes toward rape.' 47 Specifically, reformers wished to eliminate sev-
eral assumptions in the common law: that a rape charge was manifestly
suspect due to a woman's vindictive nature or susceptibility to rape
fantasies,'" that a woman's sexual history reflected on her credibility
as a witness, 49 that a woman's chastity was relevant because it tended
to prove whether she would consent to a sexual advance,'50 and that
a woman by her conduct or appearance could have contributed to the
sexual assault.' 5' In short, feminist reformers wanted to ensure that
all rape victims were treated with respect and civility and protected
undue weight to the victim's allegations of emotional trauma. See generally V. HANs & N.
VmmAR, supra note 70, at 216. Furthermore, jurors are competent to evaluate expert testimony
and do not accord it inordinate value. See id. at 196.
141. See FED. R. Evi. 412.
142. See MI. R. Evm. 412.
143. Forty-eight states have enacted rape shield legislation. The exceptions are Utah, which
has no rape shield statute, and Arizona, which has restricted sexual conduct evidence by
judicial decision. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal
for the Second Decade, 70 MI N. L. Ray. 763, 765 n.3 (1986).
144. Id. at 765.
145. Id. at 767-68.
146. J. Dssm, supra note 7, at 520.
147. See Galvin, supra note 143, at 791.
148. See id. at 792.
149. See id. at 787.
150. See id. at 783-84.
151. See id. at 794.
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from outdated misconceptions about women. In addition, they wanted
to increase rape conviction rates.5 2
The resulting state and federal rape shield statutes vary substan-
tially in both substantive and procedural content." 3 The federal statute
generally excludes past sexual conduct evidence except evidence pre-
sented at an in camera hearing 54 regarding sexual acts between the
defendant and the complainant,'55 or conduct between the complainant
and other individuals when used to prove that the defendant could not
have been the source of semen or physical injury. 5 6 Both types of
evidence pertain not to the complainant's character but rather to the
defenses of consent or mistaken identity. In addition, the statute has
a "catch-all" provision that allows the court to admit sexual conduct
evidence on a case-by-case basis upon a showing that the evidence is
"constitutionally required to be admitted."'15 7
In contrast, California's rape shield law simply prohibits evidence
relating to the victim's past sexual conduct if used to prove consent. 5 8
The effect of this legislation has been questioned because past sexual
conduct evidence still is admissible if used to attack the victim's cred-
ibility. 59 The distinction in the statute between the use of such evi-
dence to establish consent and its use to discredit the witness has been
criticized because, as one commentator stated:
[S]exual conduct evidence does not neatly break down into "con-
sent" or "credibility" uses. In most cases, the testimony of the com-
plainant establishes the crucial element of nonconsent; the two terms
thus are functional equivalents. Evidence that establishes consent by
the complainant will simultaneously impeach her credibility, and ev-
idence that impeaches her credibility will raise the likelihood of con-
sent. Thus, the statutory prohibition of either consent or credibility
evidence often can be circumvented depending upon the circum-
stances of the case.' 6
Yet, despite the flaws of the California statute, it is clear that the
legislature intended to protect women by increasing rape reporting and
conviction rates.' 6' That legislators have attempted, albeit imperfectly,
152. See id. at 797 & n.161. The law enforcement community also supported rape law
reforms to the extent that they would increase the number of rapes reported and provide for
more effective enforcement of rape laws. See id.
153. See id. at 773.
154. FED. R. Evm. 412(c)(2).
155. FED. R. Evmo. 412(b)(2)(B).
156. FED. R. EviD. 412(b)(2)(A).
157. FED. R. Evm. 412(b)(1).
158. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(b)(1) (West Supp. 1990). The statute makes an exception if
the evidence relates to prior sexual conduct with the defendant. Id. § 1103(b)(2).
159. Id. § 1103(b)(4).
160. Galvin, supra note 143, at 775-76.
161. See, e.g., Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678,
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to address the injustices inherent in the common-law attitudes toward
rape is cause for optimism. According to one commentator, "it is ar-
guable that the major contribution of the rape reform movement has
been symbolic rather than practical-that is, the reforms have raised
public consciousness regarding the violent nature of rape.' 1 62
To the extent that the public is somewhat more conscious of the
need for rape victim protection, so is today's judiciary more sensitive
to the justification for rape shield statutes that exclude evidence of
pre-rape behavior. The policy arguments that contributed to the en-
actment of these statutes also support the exclusion of evidence re-
lating to a woman's behavior after the rape.
(1) The Victim Must Be Shielded from Jury Prejudice and Ignorance
Federal rules of evidence state that even relevant evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of
the jury.63 Even if RTS evidence were considered relevant on the issue
of consent, the defense should be excluded from using it because it
causes prejudice to the victim and can confuse the jury, which already
has difficulty understanding a rape victim's experience.
Jurors place particular emphasis on the victim's life-style when
attempting to assess the guilt of the defendant. 164 An Indiana study
found, after interviewing 331 jurors, that a jury was more likely to
believe the defendant was innocent if the victim engaged in sex outside
of marriage, was a blue collar worker, or used drugs. 165 The study
indicated that in cases in which the victim's testimony formed the pri-
mary foundation of the prosecution's case, jurors were influenced more
by the victim's character than by either corroborative or hard evi-
dence.1'6
26 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1554 (1975) (authored by Thomas E. McDermott III) (citing an
interview with California State Senator Moscone in which the Senator states the aims of the
legislation reform); accord People v. Jordan, 142 Cal. Appr. 3d 628, 633, 191 Cal. Rptr. 218,
220-21 (1983) (statutory rape case in which the court held that shield laws apply at preliminary
hearings); see also Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Violent Crime, SB574 (Rape Criminal Reform), SB575 (Rape Victim Reform), at 1, (1975)
(statement of Sen. Alan Robbins, co-author of SB1678) (SB1678 passed the legislature because
a large coalition of law enforcement personnel and women's organizations tirelessly worked
to bring to the attention of the public the abuses suffered by rape victims in the treatment by
police in the courtroom; one of the goals of SB1678 was to increase the victim's willingness
to report and prosecute rape).
162. Note, supra note 37, at 1666.
163. FED. R. Evw. 403.
164. V. HANs & N. VnmsA, supra note 70, at 213-14.
165. Id. at 213.
166. Id.
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To combat this problem the federal rules of evidence allow tes-
timony regarding a victim's past sexual behavior only under three lim-
ited circumstances: when the evidence is constitutionally required to
be admitted, when it is offered to prove the source of semen or injury,
or when it pertains to conduct with the accused and is offered to prove
consent to the sexual act in question. 167 In State v. Cassidy, 6 8 the Con-
necticut Appellate Court explained why Connecticut had adopted a
similar rule:
Our legislature has determined that, except in specific instances, and
taking the defendant's constitutional rights into account, evidence of
prior sexual conduct is to be excluded for policy purposes. Some of
these policies include protecting the victim's sexual privacy and
shielding her from undue harassment, encouraging reports of sexual
assault, and enabling the victim to testify in court with less fear of
embarrassment. 6 9
The Connecticut Rape Shield Statute is noteworthy because it in-
corporates a relevancy balancing test like the one promulgated in Fed-
eral Rule 412(e)(3), which states that the defendant may offer evidence
of the victim's past behavior only upon a showing of probative value
that outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the victim. This is
a significant departure from the traditional interpretation that the party
to be protected from prejudice in a criminal case is the defendant. 70
The Connecticut court's interpretation is consistent with findings
made in 1975 by a California Senate Subcommittee on Violent Crime.' 7'
The committee considered whether to abolish the mandatory "cau-
tionary instruction,' 7 2 which was based on Lord Hale's warning that
a rape charge is easy to make. 7 1 In recommending that the instruction
be eliminated, the committee stated that "courtroom tactics which
assist in the brutalization of rape victims by providing an unequal bal-
ance between their rights and the rights of the accused should be abol-
ished. ,174
At the core of rape law reform is the assumption that the jury
is unfairly prejudiced against the victim. 75 The victim, according to
167. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
168. 3 Conn. App. 374, 489 A.2d 386, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 803, 492 A.2d 239 (1985).
169. Id. at 376, 489 A.2d at 389.
170. See Galvin, supra note 143, at 806 & n.207 ("[lt is beyond dispute that a criminal
defendant has no constitutional right to present irrelevant, prejudicial evidence in his or her
behalf").
171. Rape Criminal Reform, SB574, Rape Victim Reform, SB575, Calif. Legis. Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, Subcomm. on Violent Crime (1975) [hereinafter Rape Reform].
172. California judges were required to advise the jury "to examine the testimony of the
female person with caution and that a rape charge is a charge easily made and once made,
hard to defend against." Id. at 19.
173. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
174. Rape Reform, supra note 171, at 23.
175. See, e.g., LeGrand, supra note 124, at 75 & n.2.
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rape shield doctrine, needs protection from courtroom tactics that take
advantage of the jury's bias toward the defendant. If the defense were
allowed to introduce post-rape behavior evidence, defense counsel might
insinuate routinely that the victim did not appear to react to the rape
with anger, terror, or depression. The jury could then jump to the
conclusion that the woman consented or was not actually subjected
to sexual intercourse. 176 Victim reports, however, indicate that victims
rarely react with violence and anger, but more commonly with feelings
of shock, betrayal, and self-accusatory guilt. 177 Because this infor-
mation is beyond the ken of the average juror, the least the legal sys-
tem can do is allow limited use of RTS evidence at this juncture to
inform the jury regarding the myriad possible reactions to rape. RTS
evidence introduced by the state, however, may not be sufficient to
overcome the jury's tendency to believe the victim consented. 7 8 There-
fore, to prevent the defense from taking advantage of jury prejudice
and ignorance, the legal system should not allow defensive use of post-
rape behavior evidence in the first instance.
Given that jurors are reluctant to convict when they learn of the
victim's past sexual history, 17 9 they might be equally recalcitrant when
they hear that the victim's behavior after the alleged rape is incon-
sistent with what they would expect. Henson provides an example:
despite evidence that the victim was abducted at knifepoint and suf-
fered lacerations on her breasts, the court determined that it was less
probable that a rape occurred because of the victim's behavior the next
day. 10 Because the average person may misinterpret a seemingly cal-
lous reaction to rape as inconsistent with that of a "real" victim, it
must be reiterated that victims suffer myriad reactions to rape and that
there is no determinate timetable for predicting when a victim will
manifest any particular RTS symptom. 81 Furthermore, a great ma-
jority of rape victims are members of racial and ethnic minority
groups.8 2 It is particularly unfair to expect a victim who is, for ex-
176. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
177. Weis & Borges, supra note 127, at 119.
178. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
179. See V. HANs & N. Vm.R, supra note 70, at 209.
180. Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind. 1989). The Henson court noted that
the victim's "testimony was neither 'inherently improbable' nor did it embody 'incredible
dubiosity,' in light of her later behavior, when evaluated in the absence of the expert testimony
the appellant sought to introduce." Id. at 1194. Apparently, it was the "scientific cachet" of
the expert witness that prompted the judge to focus on the victim's post-rape behavior and to
be more critical of her testimony because of it.
181. See S. KATz & M. MAZm, UNDERSTA NING =H RAPE VicTm 217 (1979). The Authors'
synthesis of research findings indicates that some women react to rape calmly while others
become hysterical. The time frame in which women experience reactions from shock and
anxiety to denial, suppression, depression, and guilt can range from days to weeks to months.
182. J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 518.
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ample, poor, black, or a prostitute, to react to rape in the same way
as a white middle class victim. Victims from different geographic areas
may have diverse reactions as well. For example, the testimony of one
rape victim was that "The sex was nothing at all. What do you want
me to do? Be angry and hate all men? I just want to forget it. It's
New York City life and I'm not going to let it destroy me."' '83
Restricting the defense from using evidence of a woman's post-
rape behavior need not cause undue prejudice to the defense. The re-
striction would not deprive the defendant of an essential defense, such
as alibi, mistaken identity, or lack of semen or other physical evidence,
because the victim's subsequent behavior is not relevant to these issues.
The defense still would have sufficient means to successfully impeach
the witness on the basis of her testimony regarding the incident in
question. The defense could, for example, show inconsistency or lack
of conviction in her testimony, point to a lack of physical injury, or
call alibi witnesses. Perhaps of most practical importance, the defense
simply could claim consent and rest on the proven assumption that
the jury will be reluctant to convict. 84 In short, excluding RTS evi-
dence from the defendant's use does not deprive the defendant of any
traditional means of defense. On the other hand, excluding its use to
the prosecution deprives the state of the circumstantial evidence that
is so crucial when there are no physical injuries and subjects the vic-
tim's credibility to the ignorance and bias of the jury.
(2) RTS Evidence Is Not Probative on the Issue of Consent
Courts have exercised caution in allowing the prosecution to use
RTS evidence to substantiate a charge of rape. 85 The same care should
be exercised before allowing the defense to use RTS evidence to prove
consent. Neither the prosecution nor the defense should be entitled
to use medical evidence about the victim's subsequent behavior unless
it is both probative and reliable.
A clear problem with RTS evidence when used by the state is that
given the variety of behaviors encompassed, it would be difficult to
find a symptom that would not substantiate a charge of rape. 8 6 A rape
counselor in People v. Bledsoe,187 for example, described victims as
typically reacting in one of two "styles:"
183. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 21, at 362.
184. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 21, at 372. "The defense rarely ever waives a jury
trial knowing that the jury is an ally, not an enemy. Juries, which are often male-dominated,
are extremely reluctant to convict." Id.
185. See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
187. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
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One is the stress style where the victim is obviously agitated ....
And then there's the [controlled style] where the victim appears, in
fact, very controlled, her feelings are masked, her affect is subdued.
She may laugh; she may talk as though nothing has happened; she
may giggle; she may look very inappropriate for someone who's just
been assaulted. But those are normal defense postures for victims
who fall within that range.'
Because any reaction could be characterized as "normal," the
prosecution easily could bolster a rape charge by introducing an expert
witness to show how the victim's reaction is illustrative of either the
expressed or the subdued style. This is unfair to the defense and creates
a very strong argument against the admission of RTS evidence except
to explain bizarre inconsistencies between the victim's behavior and
her allegation of rape.
The use of RTS evidence by the defense is just as problematic.
Research on RTS was initiated for therapeutic use and is designed to
recognize and treat the spectrum of tangible reactions to rape. 189 The
studies have never focused exclusively on women who suffer no re-
action, probably because they usually do not report rapes, place calls
to rape trauma centers, or receive treatment at hospitals. 19 Conse-
quently, there is little medical data regarding women who are raped
but suffer no perceptible trauma. 191 Existing RTS data therefore is not
reliable to prove that a woman's behavior is inconsistent with that of
an average rape victim because that data only describes reactions suf-
fered by victims who either fiave reported rape or have been treated
for trauma. Further, existing data indicates that there is no "typical"
or "consistent" reaction among rape victims. Although most victims
suffer trauma, the manifestation of that trauma takes different forms
and occurs at different times. 192 Thus, the claim that a woman must
not have been raped because she does not have a consistent reaction
misuses existing medical evidence.
(3) Feminist Policy Reasons for Excluding RTS Evidence from the
Defense
As was so eloquently stated by the Cassidy court, rape shield sta-
tutes have been enacted to protect the victim's privacy, to shield her
188. Id. at 242, 681 P.2d at 294-95, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54.
189. See supra notes 9, 43 and accompanying text.
190. The Burgess and Holmstrom study, for example, focused only on those women who
sought help at the Victim Counseling Program at Boston City Hospital. A. BURGESS & L.
HoLmsmoM, RAPE, Caisis, AND RacovERY xii (1979). The researchers found that all of the
subjects suffered some type of Phase II symptoms. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
191. In fact, until the latter half of the twentieth century, the scientific study of rape
focused mainly on the rapist, rather than the victim. S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, supra note 181,
at xi.
192. See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
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from undue harassment, and to encourage reports of sexual assault. 93
Evidence of a victim's behavior after the alleged rape should be ex-
cluded for similar policy reasons.
A woman's reaction to rape is particularly private and sensitive.
Women should not be subjected to the ordeal of recounting how they
personally reacted to one of the most humiliating and violating ex-
periences to which a person can be subjected. This is not to suggest
that women should not testify at all, but rather that they should be
able to relate, at their discretion, merely the clinical facts of their phys-
ical and emotional reactions. They should not be subjected to ques-
tions about how they felt, or what they thought, or what they wore
or did after the rape. This invasion of privacy cannot be justified be-
cause it yields neither reliable nor probative information.
Moreover, allowing the defense to use RTS evidence would make
the prosecution of rape less efficient for no compelling reason, thus
impliedly sanctioning violence against women.194 Because women must
rely on the legal system to protect them from victimization, 95 the legal
system must do its best to avoid being governed by rules of evidence
that are based on outmoded justifications. To illustrate, there is very
little chance that a woman today will bring a false charge of rape. 196
There is therefore no reason, barring unusual circumstances, to attack
the credibility of a woman who brings a charge of rape. A final, and
equally important reason to exclude RTS evidence from the defense
is that women will be less likely to report a rape if they know their
subsequent behavior will be brought in and analyzed by an expert wit-
ness to attack their claims that a rape occurred. 97
By allowing RTS evidence on the issue of inconsistent behavior,
the court is indicating impliedly that a woman is not to be believed.
If courts were to bar admission of such evidence except with a showing
193. See State v. Cassidy, 3 Conn. App. 374, 376, 489 A.2d 386, 389, cert. denied, 196
Conn. 803, 492 A.2d 239 (1985).
194. The introduction of RTS evidence by the defense can prejudice and confuse the jury,
making it more difficult for the prosecution to convict. See supra notes 163-166 and accom-
panying text.
195. Women who physically resist a rapist are more frequently victims of injurious physical
force. J. DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 519. It is in a woman's best interests, therefore, to rely
on the legislature and law enforcement rather than on her own resources for protection.
196. See S. KATZ & M. MAzuIr, supra note 181, at 214 ("Evidence indicates that the actual
frequency of false rape reports may be very small, 2%-about the same number of false
reports as those of other crimes.").
197. When the Big Dan trial prosecuting the rape of six Massachusetts women was broadcast
on cable television, the number of women willing to report rape to the police or to proceed
with prosecution decreased. Several victims stated that the trial had made them fearful of
wide-ranging questioning and widespread media coverage. V. HAs & N. VDMsaR, supra note
70, at 201.
1170 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL ['Vol. 42
of special circumstances, they would be implying that a woman is as
trustworthy as any complainant. Because women generally are the vic-
tims of rape,98 a crime that is notoriously underprosecuted, 199 at the
very least they deserve this small token of affirmation from our legal
system. More fundamentally, a victim should not be placed in a po-
sition in which she must justify her own behavior. This smacks of a
witch-hunt: will we accept nothing short of a drowning before we ac-
cept the fact that a woman, despite her seemingly calm exterior, has
been victimized?
C. A Solution: Limited Admissibility for the Prosecution
At the core of our legal system is the tenet that the defendant is
entitled to a fair trial. It is difficult, therefore, to implement a rule
of evidence allowing the prosecution but not the defense to use RTS
evidence. Because of the unique bias in favor of the defendant in a
criminal rape proceeding, 2w however, there is some basis for tinkering
with the rules to enhance the number of rape convictions and thus
reduce the number of rapes in the long term. At the very least, until
the legislature recognizes the dangerous implications of RTS evidence
use by the defense, it is incumbent upon the courts categorically to
exclude expert testimony on RTS except when used to explain "bi-
zarre" behavior. The prosecution thus should not be able to introduce
RTS evidence for the sole purpose of substantiating a rape charge; nor
should the defense be able to use such evidence to show that the wom-
an's behavior subsequent to the rape is inconsistent with that of an
''average" victim.
If, however, the defense wishes to introduce nonexpert testimony
to show that the victim's behavior after the rape was intuitively in-
consistent with what a lay juror would expect, the prosecution then
should be entitled to call on an expert witness to educate the jury about
the myriad reactions a rape victim may experience. The following sce-
nario illustrates an appropriate use of RTS evidence:
The prosecution introduces a nonexpert to testify that the victim
has been despondent and has suffered various physical injuries. To
impeach this witness, the defense then introduces witnesses who testify
that they saw the victim dancing and drinking the night after the al-
leged rape. The prosecution may then call an expert witness to explain
that some rape victims do not immediately experience trauma or that
198. See supra note 7.
199. See V. HANs & N. VYimAR, supra note 70, at 211.
200. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
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some victims manifest emotional injury in a "controlled style."
Another scenario would be one in which the defense attempts to
impeach the witness by identifying "bizarre behavior" that casts doubt
on her reliability. For example, if the victim refused to submit to a
physical examination, or recanted her accusation, or had difficulty
remembering the location or time of day at which she was allegedly
raped, the jury might doubt the victim's credibility. The prosecution
then could introduce expert testimony that such behavior has been
documented as symptomatic of RTS.
In either of these examples, the prosecution would not call upon
the expert witness to give any opinions regarding the individual vic-
tim's condition or behavior. The prosecution's only goal in using the
expert testimony would be to mitigate preexisting juror biases with
objective medical evidence.
Conclusion
Existing medical data indicate that there is no typical reaction to
rape. Although researchers contend that all victims experience RTS,
symptoms begin at different times and occur in varying sequence. Be-
cause the spectrum of RTS symptoms is so wide, courts generally dis-
agree whether the evidence should be admissible to corroborate a rape
charge. Courts generally find the evidence sufficiently reliable, how-
ever, for use in the limited context of explaining "bizarre" behavior.
Henson v. State2 1 marked the first case in which a court was con-
fronted with the issue of whether to allow the defense to use RTS
evidence to substantiate the defense of consent. The Indiana Supreme
Court reversed the rape conviction because the defense was deprived
of using RTS evidence to show that the complainant's behavior after
the alleged rape was inconsistent with that of an "average" rape vic-
tim.
The Henson decision set a poor precedent because it failed to
recognize the existence of medical evidence indicating stoic reaction
to a rape could in fact be a manifestation of RTS. In effect, Henson
sanctioned a misapplication of available scientific evidence on RTS
and completely disregarded the political significance of allowing de-
fendants to inquire into a woman's behavior after a rape.
When confronted with a defendant who wishes to introduce RTS
evidence, courts should consider carefully whether a woman's behav-
ior subsequent to rape is a true indicator of consent and whether the
201. 535 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1989).
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benefit to the defendant of invading a woman's privacy is sufficient
to justify the humiliation it would cause. The courts should recognize
that to balance the defendant's right to a fair trial against the con-
tinuing inequities in the legal prosecution of rape, traditional rules of
evidence must be adjusted, as they were in the case of rape shield sta-
tutes, to account for the inbred biases and misconceptions jurors have
regarding victims of rape.

